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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Social networking sites (“SNS”) have transformed modern lives in more ways than 
one. We now have instant, global and seamless connectivity with one another for various 
purposes, such as dating,1 improving our professional profiles2 and maintaining friendships 
with our existing social networks.3 SNS are web-based social communities of users with similar 
interests or affiliations who interact with one another by sharing photos or images, exchanging 
text or instant messages, playing games and so on.4 As SNS have proliferated over the years,5  
they have also raised complex legal, regulatory and policy issues, such as data protection and 
privacy.6 For example, the data handling practices and policies of Facebook - one of the most 
popular global SNS - have attracted several complaints over the years.7 In recent times, the 
American privacy pressure group, the Electronic Privacy Information Centre, filed a complaint 
with the Federal Trade Commission to ask the watchdog to investigate Facebook’s use of 
Facebook customer data in its controversial “emotion contagion” experiment.8 Facebook’s data 
handling practices and policies have also been scrutinized by a number of data privacy 
regulators including the Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland.9 At policy level, 
governments across the globe are devising strategies and policies to support and promote the 
growth of the digital economy by, for example, reducing the legal and regulatory obstacles 
which prevent digital platforms, such as SNS, from prospering.10 
Debates about regulating online environments are dominated by the Lessigian idea of 
regulation through law, norms, market and “code”.11 From this vantage point, questions about 
cyberspace regulation narrowly focus on which regulatory modality achieves what function. 
Recently, some scholars have argued against the adoption of a “tools-only” perspective when 
                                                          
1 This article is based on my doctoral thesis. See A. Vranaki, Rethinking Relations and Regimes of Power in 
Online Social Networking Sites: Tales of Control, Strife, and Negotiations in Facebook and YouTube (DPhil 
Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013). For an example of a dating websites, see, 
https://uk.match.com/unlogged/landing/2016/06/02/hpv-belowthefold-3steps-geo-psc-bowling?klid=6740. 
2 E.g., https://www.linkedin.com/. 
3 E.g., https://www.facebook.com/. 
4 See N. B. Ellison, “Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship” (2007) 13(1) Journal of 
Computer‐Mediated Communication 210 for a different definition of SNS.  
5 A. Perrin, “Social Media Usage: 2005-2015” (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-
networking-usage-2005-2015/.  
6 E.g., I. Brown and C. Marsden, Regulating Code: Good Governance and Better Regulation in the Information 
Age (2013) 117; L. Edwards, “Privacy, Law, Code and Social Networking Sites” in Research Handbook On 
Governance Of The cyberspace, ed. I. Brown (2013) 309.  
7E.g., 
http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Computers/Internet/On_the_Web/Online_Communities/Social_Networ
king. See, Edwards, supra note 6 for the data privacy issues raised by SNS.  
8 E.g., S. Gibbs, “Privacy Watchdog Files Complaint Over Facebook Emotion Experiment” (The Guardian, 
2014) , https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/04/privacy-watchdog-files-complaint-over-facebook-
emotion-experiment 
9 See Office of the Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland, Audit Report of Facebook Ireland Ltd, 
http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Facebook-Ireland-Audit-Report-December-2011/1187.htm. 
10 E.g., https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market_en; https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/fact-sheets/2016/march/fact-sheet-key-barriers-digital-trade. 
11 L. Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (2006) at 5. 
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analyzing cyberspace regulation.12 Rather, they contend that we should also pay attention to 
how multiple actors interact with each other and such tools in context.13 However, these 
perspectives are still tied to regulatory concepts, such as pre-determined regulatory modalities 
and a top-down approach to regulation, which restrict analysis.14 Wider matters, such as the 
potentially multi-directional power effects generated in online platforms or resistance to 
regulation, are not examined in detail. As analyzed later, these are central matters to take into 
account when regulating online environments.  
Consequently, in this paper, I argue that we need to move away from the dominant 
cyber-regulatory lens to a conceptual lens of power that combines specific ideas about power 
from Actor-Network Theory and Michel Foucault (“ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens”) in order 
to (a) understand more fully the complexity, dynamism and precarity of the regulatory space 
in online environments when legal rights are at stake and (b) understand the complex and 
multiple power effects (including regulatory effects) generated when a legal right is protected 
or violated in digital platforms. Power effect means any enabling, constraining and productive 
force which is generated when heterogeneous technological (for example, algorithms), social 
(for example, Facebook users’ resistance practices) and legal actants (for example, legal 
reasoning) are associated in specific ways, for some time, to extract compliance from other 
actants that can resist such attempts.15 “Actants” means “…something that acts or to which 
activity is granted by others” and encompass human and non-human actors.16  
This central argument of this article is not only about heterogeneity but also about 
locality. It should not be assumed that information and communications flows are similar in 
all online environments without empirical enquiry. Despite the fact that digital environments, 
such as SNS and other Web 2.0 sites, share commonalities including user-centric platforms, 
increased mass user-generated content, and user-friendly interfaces, they also have their own 
local specificities which need to be accounted for when tackling the question of regulation. For 
example, Web 2.0 platforms may vary from one another for many reasons including different 
interaction modes. Likewise, web 2.0 platforms have “…large and dynamic graph” structures 
that differ from Web 1.0 platforms’ bow tie structures.17 Consequently, when regulators, law-
makers, law enforcers and policy-makers attempt to regulate online platforms, they need to pay 
attention to the parochial and heterogeneous specificities of such platform in order to regulate 
them effectively.  
In order to support the overall argument of this article, I use selected empirical 
findings on Facebook advertisements derived from my recent qualitative socio-legal case study 
of Facebook when data protection and privacy laws are at stake. This analysis generates the 
following three additional arguments.  
                                                          
12 E.g., C. Raab and P. De Hert, “Tools for Technology Regulation: Seeking Analytical Approaches Beyond 
Lessig and Hood” in Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Features, 
ed. R. Brownsword and K. Yeung (2008) 263 
13 E.g., id; A.D. Murray, “Conceptualizing the post-regulatory (cyber) state” in Regulating Technologies: Legal 
Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes, ed. R. Brownsword and K. Yeung (2008) 287. 
14 Vranaki, supra note 1 at 40ff.  
15 Id at 5. 
16 B. Latour, “On actor-network theory: a few clarifications” (1996) Soziale Welt 369, at 376. 
17 V. Gottfried and S. Hagemann Unleashing Web 2.0: From concepts to creativity (2012), at 12.  
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Firstly, I contend that multiple and diverse social, technological and legal actants are 
brought together when personal data rights are at stake in the context of Facebook 
advertisements. As an example, the following actants are often involved when personal data 
rights are at stake in Facebook: 
• Algorithms embodied in programming languages executing specific functions, such as 
blocking targeted advertisements and Facebook users’ interactions;18  
• Data protection in-house and external lawyers with their networks of data protection 
law knowledge, legal skills (e.g. drafting privacy policies) and commercial awareness 
(e.g. how other SNS discharge their data protection compliance obligations); and 
•  Facebook users’ interactions with brands, products and services.  
Such connections can often be rendered more obdurate through their links with “materialities” 
(for example, hyperlinks) or can fall apart (for example, resistance by Facebook users). This 
context-specific assemblage is complex as it is formed of social, technological and legal 
actants. It is also dynamic as new and old actants can join and leave the connective chain. 
Consequently, the regulatory space is far more complex and dynamic than previously thought. 
Secondly, I argue that the following five power effects, namely, (1) legalizing the 
processing of Facebook users’ personal data (or information relating to an “identified” or 
“identifiable natural person”) for targeted advertising, (2) constituting Facebook users as 
autonomous individuals, (3) mass “dataveillance”, (4) commodifying Facebook users, and (5) 
enacting particular versions of the marketplace, are generated from the local and varied 
associations which are involved when personal data rights are at stake in the context of 
advertisements. Here, I also underline how certain power effects, such as mass “dataveillance”, 
can occasionally be ruptured as Facebook users resist by installing technologies which block 
Facebook advertisements.  
Thirdly, I contend that the elicitation of valid consent in Facebook can often be a 
“perfunctory” and banal process which is reduced to mundane actions, such as button clicks. 
Here, I question to what extent Facebook users can be said to have provided valid consent in 
accordance with the applicable laws. 
The remainder of this article is divided into seven sections.  In section II, I critically 
evaluate the main academic writings on cyberspace regulation and argue that we need to move 
away from the dominant “regulatory” lens to my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens in order to 
capture the potentially complex power effects generated in SNS when legal rights are at risk. 
I, then, present the main ideas of my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens in section III. In section 
IV, I explain the methodology of this article. In section V, I provide a general overview of 
Facebook advertisements. In section VI, I outline the European data protection laws which 
regulate Facebook’s data handling practices and policies in the context of Facebook targeted 
advertisements in order to anchor the analysis which is advanced in the remainder of this article.  
In section VII, I apply my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens to analyze the diverse legal, 
technological, and social actants, such as algorithms, programming languages, data protection 
laws, and social practices which are locally connected with one another in the context of data 
protection and Facebook advertisements.  In section VIII, I build on this relational analysis of 
Facebook advertisements to explore two power effects generated from Facebook 
                                                          
18 https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=ads&section=oba&view. 
  
5 
 
advertisements, namely, legalizing the processing of new Facebook users’ personal data and 
constituting Facebook users as autonomous individuals. In the final section IX, I analyze three 
additional power effects generated from other aspects of Facebook advertisements, namely, 
mass “dataveillance”, commodifying Facebook users and enacting particular versions of the 
marketplace.  
 
II. CYBERSPACE REGULATION: FROM THE “NEW FRONTIER” TO REGULATION TO 
DYNAMIC REGULATORY SPACES TO POWER EFFECTS 
 
In this section, I present a brief and targeted critical evaluation of the three main 
themes of the cyberspace regulation literature, namely, regulation by self-regulation only; 
regulation by law, norms, the market, and “code”; and dynamic regulatory spaces. Based on 
this analytical evaluation, I argue that we need to move away from the restrictive conceptual 
lens of regulation to a wider lens of power to analyze the regulation of online platforms.  
Earlier debates about cyberspace regulation focused on the idea of cyberspace as a 
“new frontier” which is distinct from the physical world due to its lack of geographical 
borders.19 From this viewpoint, cyberspace can and should only be regulated by self-regulation 
rather than territorial laws.20  This idea has attracted various criticisms including the rejection 
of the notion that cyberspace cannot and should not be regulated by offline laws due to its lack 
of geographical borders.21  Such criticisms have led to the second theme in the cyberspace 
regulation literature, namely, regulation by law, norms, market, and “code” (“CRT”).22  
CRT argues that law regulates how individuals act by imposing rules issued by the 
Sovereign which are backed by sanctions in cases of breach.23  Norms refer to rules that do not 
emanate from an official source, such as the legislative branch, but are yet regularly complied 
with. Unlike law, norms are enforced informally through the expectations of the community. 
The market regulates through various means, such as price, which constrain and enable access 
to cyberspace.24 “Code” is the “software and hardware... that make cyberspace what it is” and 
regulates the behavior of individuals by permitting or preventing actions.25  
CRT posits that law, norms, and market can often struggle to regulate virtual worlds.26 
For example, law enforcement can often be tricky online due to the lack of physical borders 
that can increase enforcement costs. However, CRT contends that “code is law” and is the 
perfect regulatory modality in cyberspace for many reasons including its automatic application 
which does not depend on centralized or decentralized enforcement.27 CRT argues that law, 
market, “code”, and norms regulate by interacting with one another in varying degrees and 
                                                          
19 E.g., D.R.  Johnson and D. Post, “Law and borders: The rise of law in cyberspace” (1996) Stanford Law Rev. 
1367.  
20 Johnson and Post, id.  
21 E.g., J. Goldsmith, “Against Cyber-Anarchy” (1998) 65 University of Chicago Law Rev. 1221. 
22 CRT stands for cyber-regulatory theory. E.g., Lessig, supra note 11 at 4-5, 340.  
23 Lessig, supra note 11 at 223, 340. 
24 E.g. Lessig, supra note 11 at 431 
25 Id.   
26 E.g. Lessig, supra note 11 at 122-137. 
27 E.g., Lessig, supra note 11 at 342. 
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acting on the individual who is conceived as a “pathetic dot”. From this perspective, regulation 
flows only in one direction, namely, from the regulatory modality (for example, market) to the 
regulatee (the dot). 
Despite the significance of CRT to the cyberspace regulation literature, CRT has four 
key weaknesses.  Firstly, although cyber-regulatory theorists write extensively about the 
“code” as a regulatory modality in cyberspace, they conceptualize the “code” in basic terms as 
being merely “software and hardware”. In particular, they pay little theoretical and empirical 
attention to the complex process through which the “code” is constructed.28 A deeper 
engagement with the “code” as a technological artefact is vital to an analysis of its regulatory 
consequences, such as its automatic architecture.  
Secondly, many writers have underscored the weaknesses of the labels attached to the 
regulatory modalities.29 For example, CRT defines law narrowly in Austinian terms.30 I 
question CRT’s view of law as being coercive, restrictive, and mainly normative with law being 
conceptualized only as a specific section in a statutory instrument or a judgment’s ratio. This 
conceptualization of law does not account for the heterogeneous ways in which the legal 
manifests itself, such as legal skills. 
Thirdly, CRT over-simplifies the relationships between the four regulatory modalities 
as it fails to analyze the interdependencies and conflicts which exist amongst these regulatory 
modalities.  For example, by arguing that “code is law”, CRT over-generalizes the relationships 
between law and “code” without taking into account the specific empirical contexts in which 
such relationships are formed and performed. Is “code” always law in all online environments?  
Finally, CRT adopts a restrictive analytic lens of regulation which prevents it from 
analyzing how power effects are generated in cyberspace, how they interact with one another, 
and how relationships of perceived subservience emerge (for example, law being displaced by 
“code”).31 CRT’s “top-down” approach means that it can only account for power from one 
direction (that is, from the State or private companies) and understand regulation as a fixed 
social structure that shapes interactions rather than being an outcome of interactions.  
Recently, a third theme has emerged from the cyberspace regulation literature, 
namely, conceptualizing cyberspace regulation as a complex and dynamic process which 
involves interactions between regulatory modalities and human actors other than macro-actors, 
such as the State.32 Network communitarianism is particular apposite here as it uses ANT.33 
Networking communitarianism challenges the idea of the individual as a passive actor during 
the regulatory process. Network communitarians argue that the individuals form part of a 
“matrix of dots” with shared viewpoints and standards of behavior and actively participate in 
the regulatory process.34 For example, laws are passed by law-makers who are elected by the 
                                                          
28 E.g., Vranaki, supra note 1 at 38. 
29 A. Murray and C. Scott, “Controlling the new media: Hybrid responses to new forms of power” (2002) 65(4) 
The Modern Law Rev. 491. 
30 E.g., Vranaki, supra note 1 at 38. 
31 E.g., Lessig, supra note 11 at 175. 
32 Raab and De Hert, supra note 12; Murray, supra note 13.  
33 A.D. Murray, “Cyberspace Regulation” in Handbook On The Politics Of Regulation, ed. D.  Levi-Faur (2011) 
265 at 267. 
34 E.g., Murray, supra note 13. 
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community. From this viewpoint, the regulatory modalities derive their legitimacy from the 
“matrix of dots” that can challenge objectionable regulatory settlements.  
Network-communitarianism is valuable as it highlights that the individual is not a 
mere passive regulatee. However, network communitarianism raises three key issues. Firstly, 
network-communitarians fail to present a persuasive and in-depth argument about how it is 
conceptually and methodologically possible to combine the numerous theories it draws on bar 
a few mentions of some similarities between ANT and Social Systems Theory (“SST”). In my 
view, ANT and SST are less similar than network communitarianism suggests. The ANT idea 
of an “actor-network” and Luhmann’s idea of a “system” are two distinct ideas which come 
from different sociological origins. An “actor-network” refers to “… an entity that does the 
tracing and the inscribing”35 whilst a “system” can be understood in simple terms as the 
boundary between itself and the environment.36  SST builds on functionalism whilst ANT 
builds on science and technology studies, a specific substantive field of sociology which also 
gives rise to more widely applicable theorizing.  Crucially, it is highly questionable whether 
ANT’s “fibrous”, “capillary”, “ropy” “actor-network” can really be equated with the SST’s 
“system” or nodal governance theory’s “node”.   
Secondly, network-communitarianism does not capitalize on ANT’s principles of 
agnosticism and analytical symmetry when developing its conceptual prism. Agnosticism 
means that a researcher should avoid making judgments about the actants under study and 
should not privilege the account of one actant over another.37 Analytical symmetry is a 
methodological heuristic that suggests that a researcher should not distinguish between human 
and non-human actors.38  By not utilizing these principles, network communitarianism reaches 
counter-ANT arguments. For example, network communitarians understand regulation as a 
“discourse between the individual and society” rather than an effect of local and fragile 
connections between relevant human and non-human actors. Additionally, in another counter-
ANT move, network communitarians contend that a “regulatory settlement” is generally either 
imposed or challenged by society. This argument assumes that society or social elements drive 
regulatory effects in the network and betrays a de facto social constructivist stance. ANT would 
argue that this is a context-dependent conclusion.39  Finally, network-communitarianism is also 
at odds with ANT as it assumes that a “matrix of dots” emerges in the network. ANT would 
question how communities of dots emerge empirically and how one actant can speak on behalf 
of other actants. 
Based on this critique of the literature, it is clear that despite the merits of the dominant 
cyber-regulatory lens, it is not wide enough to capture the potentially complex power effects 
generated in online environments when a legal right is at risk.  However, a move towards my 
ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens enables the analysis of the intricate connections and 
dissociations between manifold social, legal, and technological actants when a legal right is at 
                                                          
35 Latour, supra note 16, at 375. 
36 For more, see, e.g., N. Luhmann, Social Systems, trans. J. Bednarz Jr. and D. Baecker) (1995). 
37 M. Callon, “Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallop and the fishermen of St 
Brieuc Bay” in Power, Action and Belief; A new Sociology of Knowledge? ed. J.  Law (1986) 196. Vranaki, supra 
note 1 at 43-50. 
38 Callon, id. 
39 Vranaki, supra note 1 at 48.  
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stake. This perspective opens up empirical inquiry as the scope of analysis is not limited to pre-
determined entities, such as the State. Rather, the positions and power effects (for example 
domination or control) of such actants are achievements generated from their connections with 
other actants. So what are the main ideas of my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens? 
 
III. POWER: OF PRODUCTIVITY, RESISTANCE AND ASSOCIATIONS 
 
Many scholars have noted the close “affinity” between Foucauldian and ANT ideas 
about power, such as, power as a productive, and enabling “effect” generated from the local, 
and fragile associations between diverse actants.40 Before analyzing the main ideas of my 
ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens, I explain the three key reasons why I am using ANT and 
Foucault in conjunction with one another in this conceptual framework. 
Firstly, I contend that, taken together, ANT and Foucauldian writings on power 
provide a stronger analytical perspective to analyze how multiple legal, social, and 
technological actants are assembled to construct a SNS as an “actor-network” when a legal 
right is at risk and the power effects generated from such local connections. For example, if I 
only use a Foucauldian approach, I would be unable to account for heterogeneity in SNS, 
beyond discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, administrative 
measures, institutions, and law in socio-historic contexts. However, by also using ANT 
principles and concepts, I can explicitly account for the roles of non-human actors, such as 
algorithms embedded in programming languages, in network construction. Likewise, if I only 
use an ANT approach, I may downplay the roles of humans in network construction. 41 For 
example, ANT, unlike Foucault, can only shed a limited light on the ethical issues raised by 
SNS users’ resistance.42  
Secondly, ANT provides me with a more practical perspective than Foucault to talk 
about the interactions between power effects because of its robust micro-sociological empirical 
approach, which is more relevant to my research of activity in contemporary SNS than 
Foucault’s genealogical and historical approach.43 In particular, ANT helps me to trace the 
construction, brittleness and dynamism of specific “orderings” and their power effects in SNS. 
“Orderings” means the myriad of ways in which heterogeneous legal, social, and technological 
actants are locally associated when legal rights are violated and/or protected.44 
Thirdly, I can develop an advanced understanding of how material conditions, such as 
hyperlinks, support specific power effects by using the Foucauldian concept of materiality and 
                                                          
40 G. Kendall and G. Wickham Gary, Using Foucault’s Methods (1998) 57.  
41 I am grateful to Professor Geoff Walsham for raising this point.  
42 M. Foucault, “The Ethic of the Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom” in The Final Foucault, ed. J. Bernauer 
and D. Rasmussen (1988) 1.  
43 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Vol. I: An Introduction (1978). 
44 E.g., Law, infra note 59; J. Law, Organising Modernity (1994) at 1ff. 
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the ANT concept of relational materiality.45 “Materiality” refers to “that which constitutes the 
matter or material of something.”46 “Material” means, 
 
matter (not precisely characterized); that which constitutes the substance of a thing 
(physical or non-physical). Thus ... materiality becomes a signifier of contingency, 
of ‘ce qui fait que tout se fait.’47  
 
“Materialities” emerge as possible partial explanations for how “orderings” or lack of 
“orderings” can be maintained over time and space and how different “orderings” can co-exist 
(or not) alongside one another. 
I now tackle five relevant ideas of my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens, namely, 
power’s provenance, power as confrontation and productivity, power as an “effect” of one 
“possible state of association”, the link between power and “materialities”, and 
“governmentality” and surveillance.  
 
A. The Provenance of Power 
 
Power does not emanate only from one single source, such as the State, or one single 
direction (namely top-down) but from multiple sources and directions (that is, also bottom-up). 
Power constitutes “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which [it] 
operate[s] and which constitute [its] own organization”.48 Despite not emanating from a single 
source of central authority, power is omnipresent because “it is produced from one moment to 
the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is 
everywhere, not because it embraces everywhere, but because it comes from everywhere.”49 
 
As such, power can only be exercised rather than being a privilege which is acquired, 
preserved and hoarded by a dominant actant. Crucially, power is the “…overall effect of 
[relevant] strategic positions”.50  Consequently, the actions of each actant involved in a specific 
connective chain are equally important for the diffusion of a token. Inertia, initial force, 
capitalization, and so on are absent to explain the successful diffusion of a token. The latter is 
rather explained as the “consequence of the energy given to the token by everyone in the chain 
who does something to it.”51  There is also an important distinction between possessing power 
and exerting power. “When an actant has power nothing happens and s/he is powerless; when, 
on the other hand, an actor exerts power it is others who perform the action”.52  
                                                          
45 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) 101.  J. Law, “Actor network theory and material 
semiotics” in The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, ed. B.Turner (2008) 141.  
46 Oxford English Dictionary. Online Version. 
47 A. Pottage, “The materiality of what?” (2012) 39 (1) J. of Law and Society 167. 
48 Foucault, supra note 43 at 92.  
49 Id. at 73. 
50 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (1977) 26.  
51 B. Latour, “The Powers of Association” in Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?, ed. J. 
Law (1986) 264, at 267.  
52 Id. at 265. 
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B. Power: The Site of Confrontation and Productivity 
 
Additionally, power is dynamic as it involves “…ceaseless struggle and 
confrontation” that constantly “…transforms, strengthens, or even reverses…” how its 
constituting relations are organized”.53  Power is an enabling and productive phenomenon 
rather than being merely restrictive and coercive.  As Foucault argues “the term power 
designates relationships between partners (and by that I am not thinking of a zero-sum game), 
but simply ... of an ensemble of action which induce others and follow from one another.”54 
 
Thus, power only exists when it is “put into action.”  Consequently, the defining 
element of a power relation in this conceptual framework is the “…representation of action 
which does not act directly and immediately on others” but rather “…acts upon their actions: 
an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the 
future”.55 ANT takes this idea of an indirect layered exercise of power (for example domino 
effects) further and talks about power as a “consequence rather than as a cause of action”.56  
Here, power seems less “powerful” than in the traditional modernist understanding and 
causation becomes much more complex because power can “summarize the consequence of a 
collective action” but cannot account for how collective action is held together.57  
 
C. Power as the “Effect” of One “Possible “State of Association” 
 
Crucially, power is an “effect…[produced from] the network of mobile, durable and 
tractable agents that have been sent out in another’s company”.58 The durability of an actor-
network depends on “immutable mobiles” or objects which can move from one location to 
another without changing. Relatedly, power is neither permanent nor stable as it is an “essence” 
which can dissolve at a later stage when one of the entities involved in the state of association 
“has gone from Name of Action to Name of Object”.59 
More precisely, power is not only an effect but rather an effect generated by one 
possible connective chain between diverse actants in an actor-network.60Power is always local 
and unstable as it “…is composed here and now by enrolling many act[ants] in a given political 
and social scheme, and is not something that can be stored up and given to the powerful by a 
pre-existing society”.61 Moreover, the actions of each actant involved in a particular associative 
                                                          
53 Foucault, supra note 43, at 92. 
54 M. Foucault, “The subject and power” (1982) Critical inquiry 777, at 786. 
55 Id. at 789.  
56 Latour, supra note 51, at 265ff.    
57 Id.  
58 J. Law, “On the Methods of Long Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation and the Portuguese Route to India” in 
Power, Action and Belief: a new Sociology of Knowledge?, ed. J. Law (1986) 234. 
59J. Law, “Power, discretion and strategy” in A sociology of monsters: Essays on power, technology and 
domination, ed. J. Law (1991) 165.  
60 E.g., see id, Latour supra note 51, Callon supra note 37.  
61 Law, supra note 59, at 141.  
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chain are essential to the existence and preservation of the token in question. In particular, each 
actant shapes the token according to his/her own project. 
Other actants follow the command. This is the outcome of local actions from actants 
present in the associative chain. When following the command, each actant “translate” the 
command according to its interests. Once a statement is obeyed, it is no longer the same 
statement as the initial one. On the contrary, it has been “translated” rather than transmitted 
and the actors are not obeying the initial statement but rather performing a specific act because 
it aligns with their own interests. So what is translation? 
Translation is a four-staged process of “problematisation”, “interessement”, 
enrolment and mobilization through which an “actor-network” is constructed.62  During 
“problematisation” one or more key actants become indispensable in defining the nature of the 
problem and the roles of the actants needed to solve the problem. The problem is defined in 
terms of the solution offered to the actants which becomes an “obligatory point of passage” for 
all the relevant actants. An obligatory point of passage is an obligatory element through which 
all the relevant actants must pass in order to achieve a result. “Interessement” refers to the 
attempts of an entity to impose roles and identities on the actants it defines through its 
“problematisation.” Enrolment refers to the definition and coordination of the roles of actants 
so that a stable network of association is generated. Mobilization refers to the stage where the 
relevant actants have accepted their roles in solving the problem or have yielded to an 
imposition of the will of others. The actants involved in translation are engaged in a collective 
process of transmission in which the thing in question is passed along from actant to actant. 
Each actant can add to, modify or block the thing in question depending on its interests. Thus, 
the actants involved in the process have different attitudes towards the thing depending on their 
interests and can do anything to the thing. Consequently, the thing is not only collectively 
transmitted by the actants but also composed of these very actants. Crucially, the outcome of 
a statement is determined by actants other than merely the enunciator of the statement.  A 
crucial idea linked to the notion of power as “effect” is that of power as a “condition, a capacity, 
something that may be stored.”63 This means that “power to” and “power over” can be 
contained and released when required.64 Next I explore the links between power and 
“materialities”.   
 
D. Power: Of Relational Materiality 
 
Material conditions, such as hyperlinks, can render some local connections more 
durable and mobile through time and space respectively. As an example, a hyperlink can be 
understood as an online navigation system which takes the person who clicks on it to the text 
to which it is linked. It is a durable and mobile representation of the set of relations that points 
                                                          
62 Unless otherwise referenced, this paragraph draws on Callon, supra note 39.  
63 J. Law, "Power, discretion and strategy" (1990) 38(1) The Sociological Review 165 at 165 ff.  
64 J. Law, “Technology and heterogeneous engineering: The case of Portuguese expansion” in The social 
construction of technological systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology, ed. W. E. Bijker 
et al (1990) 111.  
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the user to the relevant document.65 It is durable in the sense that it will not link to anything 
other than the document in question although it may stop working from time to time. It is also 
mobile as it can easily be transmitted between users, for example by copying and pasting the 
hyperlink in an email, without its contents being altered. Mobile material conditions enables 
governance at a distance as a broader range of actants can be reached and influenced.66  
Embodying local connections in durable and mobile materialities mean that such 
connections and their power effects last longer. It should be noted that some “materialities” are 
more durable than others and as such maintain relational patterns, and their power effects, for 
longer.67  Arguably, the durability of a “materiality” is not an a priori attribute of the “material” 
in question but rather an effect generated from the networks of relations within which such 
“materiality” finds itself.  
Having examined some of the general tenets of my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens, 
next, I analyze how I use the Foucauldian notions of “governmentality” and surveillance 
together with ANT ideas about surveillance. 
 
E. “Governmentality” and Surveillance  
 
“Governmentality” refers to the “conduct of conduct” or to the “...techniques and 
procedures for directing human behavior.... government of children......of a household, of a 
state or of oneself”.68 Government is “an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals 
throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what they 
do and for what happens to them”.69  
“Governmentality” is useful as it helps me to think about power sources that attempt 
to shape the conduct of actants through rational, calculated activities of multiple authorities 
and agencies to achieve “economy” for the population which becomes crucial in defining the 
aims of government. Moreover, “governmentality” facilitates an examination of the practices 
of the self which resist other forms of government. For example, “governmentality” is useful 
to analyze how SNS users often exercise their agencies through resistance. Finally, 
“governmentality” underlines how surveillance relations often emerge as strategies to organize 
Facebook. To examine surveillance relations, I use Foucauldian and ANT ideas about 
surveillance which have been developed through the metaphors of the “panopticon” and the 
“oligopticon” respectively.  
Briefly, Foucault contends that the “panopticon” generates perfect surveillance as the 
inmates imprisoned in the structure are isolated from one another in cells arranged around a 
central tower which is occupied by a central guard, who can see the inmates, but cannot be seen 
by the latter.70 In contrast to the perfect surveillance enabled by the “panopticon”, through 
                                                          
65 E.g., J. Law, “Notes on the theory of the actor-network: ordering, strategy, and heterogeneity,” (1992) 5(4) 
Systems Practice 379 at 387 and id.  
66 E.g., Id. 
67 E.g., Law supra note 59. 
68 M. Foucault, “On the Government of the Living” in Michel Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential 
Works of Michel Foucault. Vol. 1. 1954 – 1984. ed. P. Rabinow (1997) 22.  
69 Id. at 68.  
70 See Foucault supra note 50.  
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visibility and self-discipline, ANT’s “oligopticon” is a fragile construction whose vision can 
be blurred by the tiniest insect.71 Through inscriptions, such as computer programs, it enables 
one to “...see little...but see it well” in concrete places.72 Consequently, the “oligopticon” 
enables a detailed observation from a limited viewpoint. However, if the connections 
generating this view change then the vision itself changes. The “oligopticon” is a useful 
metaphor to examine surveillance relations as it conceptualizes surveillance as a “situated 
exercise” which depends on local, contingent, and precarious heterogeneous connections rather 
than flowing from one direction, namely from the “watched” to the “watcher”.73 Consequently, 
it bypasses a common problem in some surveillance studies where the “panopticon” has 
become a “straightjacket” whose walls are in danger of being “torn down” as many attempt to 
attribute general characteristics to surveillance.74    
Having explained my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens, next, I outline the methodology 
of this article.  
IV. METHODOLOGY 
 
This article is based on the findings of a qualitative case study of the power effects 
generated in Facebook when data protection and privacy rights are at stake.  As far as possible, 
I ensured that my case study was not subjective by using several strategies including data 
triangulation.  Moreover, I ensured that my case study was reliable by using various data 
analysis strategies including graphic organizers and Nvivo.  
The case study drew on virtual ethnography, documentary analysis and one qualitative 
interview. After obtaining ethical clearance, I collected these three data categories over several 
days in 2011, 2012, August 2013, and June to September 2015. 75 As a researcher based in the 
United Kingdom, I investigated the UK version of the Facebook website. I collected over 
sixteen thousand relevant Facebook users’ comments on several days from January to March 
2012, in August 2013 and from June to September 2015.76 I conducted desk-based 
documentary research on multiple days in 2011, 2012, August 2013, and June to September 
2015. Documents examined included the European data protection laws,77 the guidance from 
                                                          
71 B. Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (2007) 155.  
72 B. Latour and E. Hermant, Paris Ville Invisible (1998) 14ff.   
73 J. Nolan and M. Levesque, “Hacking human: data-archaeology and surveillance in social networks” (2002) 
25(2) ACM SIGGROUP 33.  
74 K. Haggerty, “Tear down the walls: on demolishing the panopticon,” in Theorizing Surveillance. The 
panopticon and beyond, ed. D. Lyon (2006) as cited in C. Gad and P. Lauritsen Peter, “Situated Surveillance: an 
ethnographic study of fisheries inspection in Denmark” (2009) 7(1)  Surveillance & Society 49; A. K. Franko et 
al, “Introduction” in  Technologies of (in)security. Technologies of InSecurity. The Surveillance of Everyday Life, 
ed.  A. K. Franko, et al (2009) as cited in Gad and Peter, id.  
75 The Social Sciences & Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee of the University of Oxford 
granted institutional approval in a letter dated April 20, 2011. Letter on file with author.  
76 E.g., over one thousand Facebook users comments, collected on January 20, 2012, 
https://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=10150228703690484; over three hundred Facebook user 
comments, collected on October 13, 2013, on Facebook`s call to its users to vote on the proposed changes to its 
Data Use Policy, https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150740019045301; analysis of over 400 
Facebook user comments, collected on September 4, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-and-
privacy/a-closer-look-at-a-checkup-helping-millions-of-people-control-who-they-share-wit/745499878833230. 
77 The Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31995L0046 (hereinafter “Data Protection Directive”); the Council Directive 
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advisory bodies and European data protection authorities,78 Facebook contracts,79 relevant 
parts of the Facebook website80and email exchanges between myself and a number of data 
protection authorities.81 Finally, I interviewed one senior Facebook representative on a non-
attributable basis in April 2011.82  
During data collection, I avoided generating a limitless representation of Facebook by 
identifying and following the actants which were most relevant to my enquiry.83 Thus, certain 
actants, such as European data protection laws, were examined in detail as they were very 
relevant to my investigation. Other actants, such as routers, were treated as cutting points of 
the investigations as they were not as relevant to my study.  Other actants, such as “Old 
Facebook Profile”, were not analyzed in the study as they were not used anymore.84  
Having explained the methodology of this article, next, I set out some of the relevant 
aspects of Facebook advertisements.  
 
V. EXPLORING FACEBOOK ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
Facebook advertisements are vital to Facebook’s business model as they enable the 
company to provide its website free of charge to its users. Facebook advertisements are the 
contents displayed to Facebook users at the requests of advertisers. Several contracts, such as 
the Data Policy and the Advertising Policies, govern the relationships between Facebook, its 
users, and its advertisers (“Governing Contracts”).85 Facebook advertisements can appear on 
different parts of the website, such as, the middle column on the profile pages of Facebook 
users where such users and their Facebook connections (“Friends) can share information, such 
as photographs (“Photo”). Moreover, Facebook advertisements can be displayed in numerous 
forms including an advertisement promoting a company’s Facebook page (“Page”), which is 
paired with the information that one of the Facebook users Friends has recently “liked” this 
                                                          
2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC) as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:en:HTML (hereinafter “E-Privacy 
Directive”); the GDPR, infra note 168. Only European data protection laws were analysed as they were the laws 
which applied to the European operations of Facebook.  
78 E.g., Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on Online Behavioural Advertising, 
00909/10/EN, WP 171 (June 22, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp171_en.pdf.  
79 E.g., Facebook Terms and Policies, https://www.facebook.com/policies. 
80 E.g., Facebook’s Help Centre, https://www.facebook.com/help/?ref=contextual; Facebook and Privacy, 
https://www.facebook.com/fbprivacy/?fref=ts; Facebook Advert Guides, 
https://www.facebook.com/business/ads-guide/; Facebook News Room, http://newsroom.fb.com/news/; 
Facebook f8 Developer Conferences, https://developers.facebook.com/videos/; Facebook Notes, 
https://www.facebook.com/facebook/notes; Facebook Engineering, 
https://www.facebook.com/Engineering/?fref=ts.  
81 E.g., Email from Ms Valerie Lawton, Senior Communications Advisor at the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada to author (March 23, 2012. Email on file with author. 
82 Interview of a senior Facebook representative conducted by the author on April 19, 2011 by Skype conducted 
on the basis that the transcript of the interview and the identity of the interviewee are not disclosed.  
83 M. Strathern, “Cutting the network” (1999) J. of the Royal Anthropological Institute 517.  
84 http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2011/12/15/technology-facebook-timeline.html. 
85 Facebook Terms and Policies, supra note 79. 
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Page. 86 “Like” means that a Facebook user has clicked on the “like” button to connect with 
things he likes or provide positive feedback.  
So how can advertisers create a Facebook advertisement? Once advertisers have 
created a Page, they can advertise on Facebook by using tools, such as the “Ad Creation 
Tool”.87 Amongst other things, these tools enable advertisers to construct the audience which 
is most likely to respond to their advertising campaign.  Audiences can be created by using 
both native Facebook data (for example, the user’s actions on Facebook) and non-native 
Facebook data (for example, the data which Facebook obtains from data brokers).88 Various 
traits such as, interests, job title, and purchasing information, can also be used to further refine 
audiences. Once an advertisement has been distributed to a particular audience, advertisers can 
use tools including “Audience Insights” to gain in-depth knowledge of the users who interact 
most with their advertisements.89 Advertisers can also evaluate the performance of their 
advertising campaigns by using tools, such as “Adverts Performance”.90  Based on such 
information, the advertisers can refine their future advertising strategies. For example, if the 
targeted audience does not engage with an advertisement, then the advertiser can shift its 
budget to another advertising campaign which has a better response rate.91 Finally, Facebook 
users can manage or control the Facebook advertisements they see by using several means 
including clicking the “x” on the top right corner of the advertisement and choosing “I don’t 
want to see this”. Facebook users can also tailor their Privacy Settings so that specific 
information, such as using an application, cannot be paired with advertisements.92   
Having outlined the key aspects of Facebook advertisements, next, I briefly examine 
the current European data protection laws which apply to Facebook advertisements to introduce 
the reader to the applicable laws. It should be noted that Facebook handles diverse types of 
information about its users, such as geo-location data, device information, email address, 
political views, third-party Facebook user information, and personal data collected via 
cookies,93 in order to deliver targeted advertisements.  
 
VI. FACEBOOK ADVERTISEMENTS AND EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAWS 
 
It would not be possible for me to analyze in the space of this one section all the 
European data protection laws which apply to Facebook advertisements. Consequently, I 
confine my legal analysis to Facebook’s fair and lawful processing obligations in the context 
of targeted advertising under European laws as I deal with them in the remainder of this 
                                                          
86 https://www.facebook.com/help/116118951805237. 
87 https://www.facebook.com/help/274759766036201/. 
88 E.g., https://www.facebook.com/business/learn/facebook-ads-basics.  
89 https://www.facebook.com/business/help/528690393907960. 
90https://www.facebook.com/business/help/611361848972269?helpref=search&sr=2&query=adverts%20perfor
mance.  
91 http://www.facebook.com/ads/manage. 
92 The Privacy Settings are the controls which Facebook provides to its users to enable the users to manage and 
control who can see their information on Facebook. 
https://www.facebook.com/settings/?tab=privacy&privacy_source=privacy_lite. 
93 https://www.facebook.com/privacy/explanation 
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article.94 However, it does not mean that Facebook does not have to comply with additional 
requirements under European data protection laws.95 So what are the relevant European data 
protection laws? 
The Data Protection Directive and the E-Privacy Directive as nationally implemented 
flesh out Facebook’s fair and lawful processing obligations. 96 Soft laws, such as the opinions 
of the Article 29 Working Party (“A29WP”) and the guidance of the European data protection 
authorities, can also be relevant as they clarify the wide and vague provisions of the 
directives.97 Such guidance and opinions are not binding although they impact on how 
European Economic Area (“EEA”) countries interpret the domestic laws which implement the 
directives. What is the relationship between these two directives? 
 
A. Relationship between the Data Protection and E-Privacy Directives 
 
The Data Protection Directive (as nationally implemented) applies as a lex generalis 
where relevant to the processing of personal data. Personal data” mean “any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.”98 “Processing of personal data” refers 
to “any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not 
by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction”.99 The 
provisions of the E-Privacy Directive operate as a lex specialis as they “particularize and 
complement” the Data Protection Directive. 100  Where the E-Privacy Directive does not apply, 
the Data Protection Directive applies provided that the information amounts to “personal data.” 
The scope of the E-Privacy Directive is wider than the Data Protection Directive as it applies 
to “information” which includes but is not limited to “personal data.”101 It should be noted that 
there are still strong debates about whether cookie data amounts to personal data.102 However, 
                                                          
94 Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 6(1)(a).  
95 Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 6 (1)(b)-(e), 7, 10, 11, 17, 18.  
96See Data Protection Directive and E-Privacy Directive, supra note 77. 
97 The A29WP is an advisory body which is composed of representatives of the European data protection 
authorities (“EU DPAs”), the European Data Protection Supervisor, and the European Commission that has been 
set up pursuant to the Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 29. EU DPAs are the statutory independent 
public regulatory bodies which have various functions including applying and enforcing the laws relating to the 
protection of “personal data” in EEA states.  See Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 28.  
98 See Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 2(a). It should be noted that the Data Protection Directive in 
specific circumstances including when relevant entities fall within its territorial scope. See Art. 4(1)(a)-(c). 
99 See Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 2(b). 
100 See E-Privacy Directive, supra note 77, art. 2. See Orla Lynskey, “Track[ing] changes: an examination of EU 
Regulation of online behavioral advertising through a data protection lens” (2011) 36(6) E.L. Rev. 874-886, 876. 
101 See E-Privacy Directive, supra note 77, recital 24. 
102 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search 
engines, 00737/EN, WP 148 (Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2008/wp148_en.pdf, where the A29WP argued that IP 
addresses amount to personal data as they can be traced to the user with the co-operation of the internet service 
provider; EMI & Ors v Eircom Ltd [2010] IEHC 108, available at  
http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2010/H108.html, where the Irish courts ruled that IP addresses did not 
amount to personal data; Scarlet v Sabam, Case C-70/10, November 24, 2011, available at 
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such debates may become less important when the new European data protection law – the 
GDPR - applies given that it defines personal data as including “online identifiers.”103  
 
 The amended E-Privacy Directive is relevant to Facebook advertisements because of 
Facebook’s use of cookie data to deliver targeted advertisements to its users. Cookies are small 
text files which are installed on the devices of the users for various reasons, such as collecting 
information about the user.104 Additionally, where applicable, as a data “controller”, Facebook 
also has to comply with the Data Protection Directive (as nationally implemented).105 A data 
“controller” is a “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which 
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data.”106  
 
B. Applying Article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive to Facebook Advertisements 
 
The revised article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive regulates the use of cookies or 
similar technologies by Facebook on the terminal equipment of its users by providing that:  
 
Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or the gaining of access 
to information already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is 
only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user has given his or her consent, 
having been provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance 
with Directive 95/46/EC107  
 
Under Article 5(3), Facebook can only place cookies on the devices of its users if it 
has obtained informed consent from its users prior to such technologies’ placement on the 
                                                          
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=617023, where the CJEU ruled that IP addresses amounted to personal data as 
they enabled users to be directly identified; and the referral by the German Federal Court to the CJEU on whether 
dynamic IP addresses amount to personal data Bundesgerichtshof Mitteilung der Pressestelle, Vorlage an den 
EuGH in Sachen "Speicherung von dynamischen IP-Adressen" No. 152/2014, available at 
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2014&Sort=3&nr=69184&pos=0&anz=152. 
See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, 01248/07/EN, 
WP 136 (June 20, 2007) available at 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf where the A29WP argues that 
cookies in themselves, even when they do not contain IP addresses, can amount to personal data.   
103 See GDPR, infra note 168, art. 4(1). 
104 It should be noted that there are different types of cookies, such as functional cookies installed by the website 
provider to provide the user with access to the website, and non-functional cookies such as cookies installed by 
third-parties to collect information about the users. Functional cookies are typically exempt from the provisions 
of the E-Privacy Directive unless they are also used to collect information about the users. See E-Privacy Directive, 
supra note 77, art. 5(3).   
105 See Lynskey, supra note 100. For the provisions on establishment, See Data Protection Directive, supra note 
77, art. 4.  
106 See Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 2(d). 
107 It should be noted that third-parties, such as service providers used by Facebook, can also use cookies. 
However, I do not consider this aspect in this article. See Facebook, Cookie Policy, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/cookies?ref_type=sitefooter. 
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device of the user. Informed consent can only be obtained if Facebook has provided the user 
with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with the Data Protection Directive, 
about several matters including the purposes of the cookies.108   In the context of Facebook 
advertisements, this means that Facebook has to inform its users that one of the purposes of the 
cookies is to enable Facebook to deliver targeted advertisements to the users. Such information 
should be “clear and comprehensive,”109 and be presented in a “user friendly,” “easily 
accessible and highly visible” manner.110  
Valid consent for the purposes of the E-Privacy Directive corresponds to the consent 
given by the “data subject” under the Data Protection Directive,111 a point examined further in 
Section V(C) below. Facebook also has to comply with the Data Protection Directive for 
“processing” the personal data of its users in order to deliver targeted advertisements. So what 
are the main provisions of the Data Protection Directive which apply to Facebook 
advertisements? 
 
C. Facebook Advertisements and the Data Protection Directive  
 
In its Data Policy, Facebook recognizes that the corporate entity, Facebook Ireland 
Ltd., is the data “controller” for Facebook users based outside of Canada and the US.112 If this 
is accepted, then it means that the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland is the 
main data protection regulator for the activities of Facebook Ireland Ltd. and is the competent 
regulator for the activities of Facebook Ireland Ltd.113 However, and crucially, this does not 
mean that other European data protection regulators or Member States’ courts cannot also 
regulate how Facebook Ireland Ltd. and other Facebook entities handle personal data.114  
The Data Protection Directive provides Facebook users, in their capacities as data 
subjects, with specific rights, such as access, rectification, erasure, and objection rights.115 The 
Data Protection Directive also imposes several obligations on Facebook, such as fair and lawful 
                                                          
108 See A29WP Opinion on OBA, supra note 78.   
109 See E-Privacy Directive, supra note 77, recital 25.  
110 Id.  
111 See E-Privacy Directive, supra note 77, art. 2(f). The Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 2(a) defines 
a “data subject” as an “identified or identifiable natural person…an identifiable person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” 
112 https://www.facebook.com/privacy/explanation. Facebook Inc. is the data “controller” for Facebook users 
living in the US and Canada. 
113 In Ireland, the Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, has been nationally implemented by the Data 
Protection Act 1988 (as amended in 2003), available at http://www.dataprotection.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=796. 
114 E.g., Willem Debeuckelaere (President of the Belgian Commission for the Protection of Privacy) v. Facebook 
Inc., Facebook Belgium SPRL, and Facebook Ireland Limited, 15/57/C, November 9, 2015, available at 
https://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/Judgement%20Belgian%20Privac
y%20Commission%20v.%20Facebook%20-%2009-11-2015.pdf; Google Spain SL v Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos, Case C-131/12, (2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30dd7a8d4de5f8924b8981908f4c6ceda
6bb.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuPb3z0?text=&docid=153853&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=53717. 
115 Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 12 and 14.  
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processing obligations.116 The fair processing obligation means that Facebook has to provide 
specific information to its users including the identity of the data “controller” and its processing 
purposes.117 In the context of targeted advertising, this means that Facebook has to explain to 
its users this specific processing purpose in as much detail as possible. Additionally, Facebook 
cannot process personal data for purposes which are not compatible with the specified 
purposes.118  
The lawful processing obligation means that Facebook can only process the personal 
data of its users if one of the legitimating grounds laid down in Article 7 of the Data Protection 
Directive is satisfied. At present time, Facebook relies on valid consent as the legitimating 
ground for its processing purposes including targeted advertising. 119 Consent is defined as “any 
freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies 
his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed.”120 
Additionally, valid consent must be unambiguous.121 The provisions of the directive 
on consent suffer from similar defects as the remainder of the directive, namely, vagueness and 
inconsistent implementation by the EEA territories. The non-binding guidance of the A29WP 
can shed light on how Facebook can obtain valid consent.122 
According to the A29WP, for consent to be valid, Facebook users have to signify their 
wishes for their personal data to be processed by the Facebook through an active action123. 
Additionally, consent can only be “freely given” if the Facebook user can exercise real choice 
which is free from deception, intimidation, coercion or significant negative consequences if he 
fails to consent.124 Moreover, the Facebook user provides “specific” consent if he provides it 
in relation to a specific type of personal data and processing purpose.125 Thus, Facebook has to 
explicitly, clearly and fully explain the scope and purposes of processing. Facebook must 
provide this information directly to the Facebook user. The information must also be 
prominently displayed on the website. Consent also has to be “unambiguous” in the sense that 
Facebook does not doubt that the user intends to consent to the processing. 126  
Next, I examine selected empirical findings of my Facebook case study to illustrate 
that multiple legal, social and technological actants are locally and dynamically connected with 
one another in the context of Facebook advertisements and data protection.  
                                                          
116 Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 6(1)(a). 
117 Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 10(a)&(b). 
118 Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 6(1)(b).  
119 Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 7(a). Facebook could arguably also rely on “legitimate interests” 
as a ground for the lawful processing of the personal data of its user for specific purposes including advertising.  
120 Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 2(h). A “data subject” is an “…identified or identifiable natural 
person…” See Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 2 (a). 
121 Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 7(a). 
122 E.g., A29WP Opinion on Search Engines, supra note 102, A29WP Opinion on OBA, supra note 78, Article 
29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent, 01197/11/EN , WP187 (July 
13, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp187_en.pdf. 
123 E.g., A29WP Opinion on Consent, Id., at 11-24.  
124 Id. 
125 E.g. Id. 
126 When Facebook processes sensitive personal data - “data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex 
life” - it has to obtain explicit consent from its users. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 8(1).  
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VII. FACEBOOK ADVERTISEMENTS AS “ACTOR-WORLDS” 
 
The analysis presented in this section supports my central argument that we need to 
use concepts, other than regulatory concepts, to understand more fully the complex, context-
specific, dynamic and precarious assemblage of legal, social and technological actants which 
are involved when legal rights are at risk on online platforms such as SNS. For avoidance of 
doubt, this section provides one account of the diverse connections involved in the context of 
Facebook advertisement and data protection rather than a definitive account of all relevant 
connections at all times.127  
As Facebook flourished from a website with limited membership to one of the most 
popular social networking sites globally, one of its challenges has been how to model its 
business so that it can continue providing a free and innovative service to its rapidly growing 
customer base whilst generating enough revenue to subsidize its operations.128  The solution to 
this problem, framed by various Facebook teams, such as Facebook’s management team, is to 
generate revenue by serving advertisements, paid for by third-parties, to Facebook users.129 
Facebook advertisements are framed as “problems-solutions” through which all the relevant 
actants have to occasionally pass.130 For example, Facebook users cannot completely block 
Facebook advertisements and they are, in theory at least, likely to see an advertisement when 
they visit the website.131  Facebook advertisements have not emerged as “problem-solutions” 
from a state of nature but rather from numerous interactions between various actants, such as 
Facebook teams, algorithms, data protection laws, and mouse clicks.  In particular, as analyzed 
next, although some actants, such as Facebook teams, play important roles in defining the 
initial stages of articulating the problem, other actants are also key to the translation of 
Facebook advertisements. These actants also change the “problematic field” as they bring their 
own interests with them whilst engaging with the problem. To illustrate this point, I focus on 
five important moments of translation.  
Firstly, for the “problem-solution” to succeed, Facebook must persuade current and 
prospective users to remain on or join the website, while being served with advertisements.132 
In most cases, individuals use Facebook to maintain social ties with their old and new 
connections rather than to be served with advertisements.133 Targeted advertisements can often 
be unappealing to surfers for various reasons including lack of transparency and control over 
how advertisers use their personal information. 134Websites which are also brimming with 
                                                          
127 The empirical analysis set out in this section as well as Sections VIII and IX are derived from an in-depth 
examination of all the sources set out in Section IV. See Vranaki, supra note 1, chapters 6 & 7. 
128 Interview, supra note 82.   
129 E.g., Interview supra note 82. 
130 E.g., https://www.facebook.com/help/146952742043748?helpref=uf_permalink. 
131 Id. 
132 http://www.businessinsider.com/is-facebooks-commercialization-bad-2013-3?IR=T.  
133 See A. N. Joinson, “Looking at, looking up or keeping up with people?: Motives and use of Facebook” in 
Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (2008) 1027. 
134 J. Knit, “Outside Voices: Online Advertising Has a Trust Problem” (Wall Street Journal 2014) 
http://blogs.wsj.com/cmo/2014/06/20/online-advertising-has-a-transparency-problem/; T. Morey, T. Forbath and 
A. Schoop, “Customer Data: Designing for Transparency and Trust” Harvard Business Review (2015) 
https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-data-designing-for-transparency-and-trust. 
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advertisements can often be slow as it takes longer for the advertisements to load.135Diverse 
strategies are deployed by multiple actants to align the interests of Facebook users with those 
of Facebook. For example, Facebook’s engineering and management teams rally around design 
and layout choices so that a limited number of advertisements are displayed on the website to 
ensure that such advertisements do not intrude on the experience of the users.136 Implementing 
such design and layout choices depends on other actants. For example, as some sections of the 
Facebook page (for example, profile photo) load more quickly than other sections (for example, 
advertisements), the engineering team has to select the order in which they will load the features 
of the website in the “pipeline” so that the users remain on the site whilst the whole page is 
downloaded.  Pipelining enables the simultaneous performance of instructions to expedite the 
execution of all the instructions. By pipelining some parts of the Facebook page (for example, 
profile name, search bar) separately from other parts of the page (for example, advertisements) 
which may take longer to load, the engineers attempt to convince the users to remain on the 
site whilst the remainder of the page loads.  
Moreover, other actants, such as other algorithms, data categories, Friends, and clicks 
on drop-down boxes, are mobilized to generate the Privacy Settings – a space where Facebook 
users can manage and control data flows. Illustratively, Facebook users can tailor their Privacy 
Settings by clicking on a drop-down box in the Privacy Settings to prevent actions, such as 
their “likes”, from being paired with an advertisement. Here, algorithms enable or prevent data 
flows through their interactions with other actants.137 Moreover, social practices, such as 
providing detailed information on how advertisements are created, attempt to overcome some 
Facebook users’ qualms about advertisements by demystifying Facebook’s advertising 
processes.138  
Secondly, for the “problem-solution” to succeed, Facebook has to “interesse” and 
enroll advertisers by providing them with innovative and highly individualized ways to reach 
the most relevant Facebook users. In particular, many advertisers would not use Facebook 
advertisements if Facebook did not provide them with new ways to target existing or new 
customers.139 Audience creation is key here and it is not simply a technological process but 
rather a socio-legal-technological process. For example, the categorization of a Facebook user 
as a 20 year old female who in all likelihood enjoys streaming science fiction shows is 
generated from manifold connections. Relevant connections include: 
• The Facebook user “liking” Netflix’s Page; 
• Native user data (that is Facebook data), such as age, personal interests, 
favorite TV shows; 
• Non-native user  data (that is, third-party data), like the  genres of DVDs 
purchased in a physical store;  
• The Facebook user consenting to the terms of the Governing Contracts; 
• Technical operations (for example, patterning);  and  
                                                          
135 F. Filloux, “News Sites Are Fatter and Slower Than Ever” (Monday Note, 2015), 
https://mondaynote.com/news-sites-are-fatter-and-slower-than-ever-1dc7adebfc90#.p3k3udqcg. 
136 Infra notes 148 and 149. 
137 A. Goffey, “Algorithm” in Software Studies: A Lexicon, ed. M. Fuller (2008) 15.  
138 https://www.facebook.com/about/ads. 
139 Interview, supra note 82.   
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• Algorithmic rules and processes embodied in programming languages.140  
Moreover, some Facebook teams mobilize video tutorials and web pages to provide detailed 
information on audience creation so as to minimize any difficulties advertisers may encounter 
when generating the audience for their advertisements.141  Additionally, as discussed in Section 
VIII , Facebook’s legal and public policy teams mobilize others actants, such as specific 
statutory data protection laws, legal skills, legal knowledge, hyperlinks, Facebook’s 
engineering team, and drafting skills, to generate specific conditions where Facebook user’s 
personal data can be lawfully used for targeted advertising by, for example, obtaining the valid 
consent of the users.142 
Each of these actants appears as a “black-box” which hides from view the underlying 
hybrid connections generating them. Illustratively, when the black-box of non-native data is 
opened, diverse connections appear including data mining techniques, such as, classification, 
clustering, and predictions; aggregated online and offline third-party data about Facebook 
users; data sharing agreements between Facebook and third-parties; and hashing techniques. 
143 The view of these acants depends on their vantage points in the network. For example, the 
Facebook user sees the “like” button as a simple user interface of a white thumb up with a blue 
outline. However, other actants, such as the third-party application developers who import the 
“like” button on their websites, see the “like” button as a series of punctuation marks, and alpha 
numerical numbers such as “<div class="fb-like" data-href="http://cyberpanda-
cyberpanda.blogspot.co.uk/" data-layout="standard" data-action="like" data-show-
faces="true" data-share="true"></div>”144 
 
This insight is crucial as it shows that the discursive limits which may apply in one 
reality (for example, the “like” button as a user interface) do not apply in another reality, such 
as the “like” button as a string of code, commas, brackets etc.  Such discursive limits may 
enable or restrict how an actant interacts with the “like” button.  For example, the material 
form of the “like” button – a white thumb-up with a blue outline - denotes to the Facebook user 
a stable network of connections. However, it also conceals from the user’s view the multiple 
modes of “action upon action” are activated when the user clicks on the “like” button. Thus, 
when a Facebook user “likes” a Friend’s Photo, disparate actants including some algorithms 
embodied in the graphical user interface, other algorithms embodied in programming 
languages, clicks by the Facebook user, mouse movements, Friends, and information stored on 
servers (for example, a Photo) are mobilized to generate the effect of a Facebook user “liking” 
the Photo of a Friend. This simplification of the sequences of “action upon action” also hides 
from view the precarity of these connections. Algorithms can be hacked and cease to function 
in the anticipated ways, servers may be temporarily unavailable, Photos may eventually be 
deleted by their owners, or broadband connections can slow down.145 
                                                          
140 Supra note 138. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Hashing is “the transformation of a string of characters into a usually shorter fixed-length value or key that 
represents the original string.” TechTarget, http://searchsqlserver.techtarget.com/definition/hashing. 
144 https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/like-button. 
145 S. Pold, “Button” in Software studies: a lexicon, ed. M. Fuller (2008) 31, at 32.  
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Other than providing Facebook and data brokers with raw data through their online 
and offline interactions, what are the roles of Facebook users in the process of audience 
generation? Contrary to CRT which assumes that the Facebook user is a “pathetic dot” who is 
merely regulated by the regulatory modalities, my data analysis shows that Facebook users 
actively participate in or resist the process of audience generation.146 For instance, Facebook 
users can actively alter or refine how they categorize audiences by constantly providing 
Facebook and third-parties with new information about their habits, interests, and so on. This 
constant circulation of new data about Facebook users from multiple sources lead to a dynamic 
refinement of Facebook users as audiences. Moreover, Facebook users can actively resist this 
dynamic data collection by installing third-party technologies, such as AdBlock, to block 
Facebook advertisements, or opting out of the collection of their personal data when they visit 
third-party websites.147 Consequently, information flows and dams are constantly etched 
through these (and more) local connections.  
Thirdly, as Facebook’s engineering team interacts with the “problem” as originally 
defined by Facebook’s management team, it also adds to the “problematic field” by bringing 
its own set of interests and skills. Typically, one of the principal considerations of Facebook’s 
engineering team is to develop a scalable architecture which can support Facebook’s ever-
growing subscription base and the large amount of information it handles every second.148 This 
aim does not exist in a state of nature but is generated from a complex network of computing 
skills, algorithms embodied in several programming languages, and computing knowledge 
which have been mobilized, through Facebook’s engineers, to generate Facebook’s 
components. Thus, certain technical considerations including scalability, latency and the state 
of the art impact on how certain aspects of Facebook are shaped, such as the optimization of 
communications between the servers storing advertisements.149 However, this does not mean 
that Facebook’s engineering team has a privileged role when developing these features because 
the decisions about the technical operations, and layout and design of these features are 
continuously refined through the interactions between Facebook’s engineering team and other 
Facebook teams (for example, legal and management).  
Fourthly, Facebook’s Management have to “interesse” and enrol Facebook’s public 
policy and legal teams to ensure that the advertisements distributed on Facebook comply with 
the applicable data protection and privacy laws. Various strategies are used to “interesse” 
Facebook’s public policy and legal teams, such as conversations in the hallway and email 
correspondence.150 As Facebook’s public policy and legal teams interact with the “problem” 
they also add another dimension to the “problem,” namely, how Facebook can provide its users 
with a free and lawful social networking platform, subsidized by advertising content.  Here, 
Facebook’s public policy and legal teams bring their own networks of legal texts, drafting 
                                                          
146 E.g., Facebook comments, infra note 147. 
147 E.g., https://getadblock.com/ and my analysis of over one hundred Facebook user comments on the following 
Facebook Page post, https://www.facebook.com/heres.adblock, where Facebook users state they use such 
technologies to block Facebook advertisements. 
148 E.g., H. Barrigas and others, “Overview of Facebook’s Scalable Architecture” ISDOC '14 Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Information Systems and Design of Communication (2014) 173. 
149 E.g., S. Srivastava and A. Singh, Facebook Application Development with Graph API Cookbook (Packt 
Publishing 2011); Barrigas, id.  
150 Interview, supra note 82.   
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skills, legal reasoning, legal interpretation, and more which impact on the initial “problem-
solution”. From the perspectives of Facebook’s legal and public policy teams, specific issues, 
such as, obtaining valid consent from Facebook users for using their data to deliver targeted 
advertisements, become key considerations to ensure that Facebook advertisements comply 
with the relevant laws.151  This in turn impacts on the actions of other actants, such as 
Facebook’s engineering and management teams. To cite an instance, if the technical operations 
of a tool contravenes data protection laws, then this is very much a “deal-breaker” for 
Facebook’s engineering and management teams.152 In such cases, the tool has to be amended 
to comply with the relevant laws.  Empirical evidence of the enrolment of Facebook’s public 
policy and legal teams in the scheme of Facebook’s management team abound. For example, 
Facebook’s public policy and legal teams have utilized their legal reasoning and interpretation 
skills to evaluate Facebook’s data protection obligations when it installs cookies or similar 
technologies on the devices of its users for targeted advertising purposes and how it can 
discharge these obligations.153 Here, Facebook’s public policy and legal teams have discharged 
Facebook’s obligations under data protection laws by, for instance, drafting the Cookie Policy 
in an appropriate manner so that the company discloses to its users, in clear and simple terms, 
the purposes for which cookies and similar technologies are installed.154 
Finally, during mobilization, several actants have accepted their roles in solving the 
problem. Empirical evidence of mobilization include the creation of advertisements by 
advertisers, and Facebook users tailoring their Privacy Settings to control the types of 
information which advertisers can use in an advertisement. The successful translation of 
Facebook advertisements depends on the maintenance of the links between its constituting 
actants. However, such local connections can be ruptured as new actants are introduced in the 
network or old actants leave the network. For example, in January 2011, Facebook introduced 
a new element in the network, namely, that advertisers had to agree to an advertising data 
protection agreement which limits the number of cookie that can be dropped on the computers 
of Facebook users to only one.155 Consequently, the associative chain generating the profiling 
of the Facebook users on external websites through cookies or similar technologies changed at 
that point as a new actant, namely, the data protection agreement with its underlying 
connections was brought into the network. Additionally, in cases where Facebook users resist 
advertisements by using third-party technologies, successful mobilization of Facebook 
advertisements are hindered.156 I analyze the power effects of such oppositions later on in this 
article. 
Having considered how Facebook advertisements are constructed as a socio-legal-
technological “assemblage”, I now scrutinize the complex and multiple power effects 
generated from these materially heterogeneous connections.  
 
                                                          
151 E.g., Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 2(h). 
152 Interview, supra note 82.   
153 E.g, Facebook’s cookie and privacy policies, infra note 79.  
154 See https://www.facebook.com/help/cookies/update. E.g., E-Privacy Directive, supra note 77, art. 5(3) and 
recital 25. See https://www.facebook.com/privacy/explanation. 
155 E.g., Audit Report, supra note 9, at 58.  
156 E.g., Facebook user comments, supra note 147. 
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VIII. RITUALS OF CONSENT 
 
In this section, I analyze selected empirical findings on how Facebook elicits valid 
consent from its new adult users for the purposes of processing their non-sensitive personal 
data, excluding cookie data, for targeted advertising.157 I argue that two power effects are 
generated from the materially heterogeneous connections forming consent, namely, legalizing 
data processing for targeted advertising and constituting Facebook users as fully autonomous 
individuals. Additionally, through my consideration of the mundane and banal actions through 
which new Facebook users provide their consent, I question to what extent such users have 
truly provided valid consent.  
So how does Facebook obtain valid consent from its new adult users? To answer this, 
we need to go to the “Sign-Up” page, illustrated by Screen shot 1 below that greets prospective 
adult users. 
Screen shot 1: Facebook’s Sign-Up Page 
 
Screen shot 1 above shows that Facebook’s Sign-Up page is composed of various 
routine features, such as text-boxes, hyperlinks to the Governing Contracts,158 the “Sign-Up” 
button, and explanatory statements, which are also common place on other websites. Once the 
users have completed this page and clicked on the “Sign-Up” button, two additional pages then 
greet them where they are prompted to find their Friends on Facebook by synchronizing their 
email or Skype address books with their Facebook accounts and add a profile Photo. Facebook 
can use such information to serve targeted advertising to these users. For example, the profile 
Photo of a new user who has interacted with an application can be used to create an 
advertisement promoting the application to the new user’s Friends.   
 How do adult users provide valid consent to the processing of their personal data for 
advertising purposes when they first join the website? In plain terms, new adult users consent 
                                                          
157 See supra note 79. 
158 Id. 
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to specific processing purposes, including advertising, by agreeing to the Governing Contracts, 
in particular the Data and Cookie Policies, by clicking on the “Sign-Up” button.  Facebook 
applies its default settings to all the information provided by its new users until such users  have 
tailored their Privacy Settings to manage the visibility of particular information categories. 
Typically, after navigating through the sign-up screens, many new users often start to interact 
on Facebook without tailoring the default settings. Additionally, such users are not informed 
that Facebook’s default settings apply to their information and that they can amend these 
settings by tailoring their Privacy Settings. Screen shot 2 below illustrates the default settings 
that apply to Facebook advertisements: 
 
 
Screen shot 2: Default Privacy Settings for Facebook Advertisements 
 
Screen shot 2 shows that by default the social actions of new Facebook users can be paired 
with advertisements which are shown to all their Friends. Additionally, by default, 
advertisements which are based on the activities of Facebook users on external websites are 
also enabled. 
From my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens, as fully explained next, valid consent is 
understood as a relational achievement which depends on local associations between legal, 
social, and technological actants rather than merely social or legal or technological actants. 
Which connections lead to valid consent? As an illustration, Facebook’s legal and public policy 
teams bring with them their networks of legal skills (for example, interpretation and reasoning), 
the texts of the relevant data protections laws, and the guidance of the relevant data protection 
authorities to deduce that Facebook can only obtain “specific” consent from its users if its 
explains explicitly, clearly, and fully the scope and purposes of its processing operations to its 
new users before they sign up to the service. These informational documents also need to be 
written in clear and simple terms, should be accessible and should be prominently displayed to 
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the users on the Sign-Up Page. 159 Moreover, Facebook’s legal and public policy teams have to 
rally around Facebook’s engineering team, through discussions, so that the latter provide the 
users with access to the full texts of the relevant Governing Contracts on the Sign-Up page. 
Facebook users can access the Governing Contracts via hyperlinks which are located on the 
Sign-Up Page. Such hyperlinks take the users to the full texts of the relevant Governing 
Contracts uploaded on content management systems.  
Here, Facebook’s engineering team have assembled some algorithms embodied in 
programming languages to generate hyperlinks which take the Facebook user, located in one 
jurisdiction, to the texts of the relevant Governing Contracts which are typically uploaded on 
multiple worldwide servers. The routine material representation of the hyperlink on Screen 
shot 1, as a text in a different color coupled with the banal action of clicking on the hyperlink, 
conceals from the Facebook user’s view the complex interconnections that take the user to the 
target document.  As analyzed later, such simplifications obscure problems which can be 
created when mundane tools, such as hyperlinks, are used to elicit valid consent.  
Additionally, Facebook’s engineering teams make important design choices in terms 
of the layout as well as the look and feel of the Sign-Up page. Crucially, not all of these choices 
are technological ones. For example, legal rationalities impact on certain design choices 
including where to place the hyperlinks to the Governing Contracts on the Sign-Up page.160 As 
shown by Screen shot 1, the hyperlinks to the relevant Governing Contracts are placed 
immediately before the “Sign-Up” button so that Facebook users can access and read the 
Governing Contracts before consenting to them by clicking on the “Sign-Up” button. If the 
hyperlinks are placed beneath the Sign-Up button, arguably, Facebook users have not provided 
informed consent as they have not been provided with an opportunity to read the Governing 
Contracts in full before joining the website. 
Here, the legalization of Facebook’s processing operations becomes increasingly an 
“achievement” which connects disparate actants, such as buttons, hyperlinks, Governing 
Contracts, processing operations, and Facebook users, in an “assemblage” or a more or less 
coherent entity. Some of these techniques which regulate personal data are constituted by as 
well as constitute law. For example, the practice of using multiple layers including hyperlink 
and full text layers to represent the Governing Contracts is shaped and targeted by complex 
webs of data laws, such as advice from the relevant European data protection authorities on 
layered notice.161 
Importantly, valid consent is a dynamic “achievement” as other actants can 
occasionally join the associative chain and change the status quo. For example, after the Data 
Protection Commissioner of Ireland audited Facebook Ireland Ltd.’s operations and policies, 
it issued a number of best practice recommendations to Facebook.162 One of its 
recommendations was that Facebook should clarify the wording of its Governing Contracts so 
that it communicated more transparently to its users how it used their data to deliver targeted 
                                                          
159 E.g., Data Protection Directive, supra note 77, art. 2(h); Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland, Guidelines 
for the contents and use of Privacy Statements on Websites, accessible at 
https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/PrivStatements/290.htm. 
160 E.g., id., Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland. 
161 Id.. 
162 Audit Report, supra note 9.  
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advertisement.163 Here, a new actant, namely, the Irish regulator joined the connective chain 
with its own set of interests, such as, improving Facebook’s legal compliance in various areas 
including informational transparency.164  
These diverse connections also constitute Facebook users as fully autonomous 
individuals who join Facebook with complete awareness and agreement of how the company 
handles their information. However, the routinisation of valid consent conceals that many 
Facebook users often do not read or may not fully understand the relevant Governing 
Contracts.165 Moreover, the ways in which actions have been mechanized here can lead to 
circumstances where particular power imbalances are generated. For example, new Facebook 
users are not explicitly told about the Privacy Settings and its default settings which apply 
automatically to their information when their sign up to or interact on the website. 
Consequently, until such Facebook users become aware of the Privacy Settings and make 
informed decisions about the settings they wish to apply to each information type, such 
information types arguably remain visible to a large group of individuals. This may potentially 
impact on the quality of the consent given by Facebook users as one could question to what 
extent such users have exercised their choice fully until they have formed reached an informed 
decision on the applicable setting for each information category.  
Additionally, the action of clicking on the graphical user interface of the “Sign-Up” 
button by a mouse click is an ordinary action which Facebook users perform elsewhere in 
digital environments where actions are often mediated by the mouse click. For example, we 
click on the mouse to open applications on our device, to input keywords in online search 
engines and open webpages. These actions can often be different in nature and in terms of legal 
effects. The use of similar mundane action (that is the mouse click) to provide consent means 
that the subject-matter of the decision becomes even more removed from the individual.166 This 
raises important questions about the validity of the consent obtained. To what extent can an 
individual be said to have formed a reasoned decision about sharing his personal data for a 
specific purpose if the act signifying this decision is not distinct from other mundane acts? For 
instance, in healthcare, patients signify their informed consent to a particular medical procedure 
by a distinct act, namely, signing a lengthy document, which is sufficiently different from their 
everyday actions, such as reading a book in a bookshop or paying for their weekly supermarket 
shopping by tapping their bank cards.  
This raises important questions about the validity of the consent obtained. To what 
extent can an individual be said to have formed a reasoned decision about sharing his personal 
data for a specific purpose if the act signifying this decision is not distinct from other mundane 
acts? For instance, in healthcare, patients signify their informed consent to a particular medical 
procedure by a distinct act, namely, signing a lengthy document, which is sufficiently different 
from their everyday actions, such as reading a book in a bookshop or paying for their weekly 
supermarket shopping by tapping their bank cards.  
                                                          
163 Id., section 3.2  
164 Id. 
165 Recent research suggests that 79% of SNS users read half or less of informational materials before joining a 
website.  See T. Ploug and H. Soren, “Routinisation of informed consent in online health care systems” (2015) 
84(1) International J. of medical informatics 229. 
166 Id.  
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This “routinisation” of consent also hides how valid consent can often be a mere ritual 
used to show that legal obligations have been complied with rather than a substantial exercise 
which ensure that Facebook users have indeed given clear, informed, and unambiguous consent 
to all processing purposes. In particular, hyperlinks can break down, be temporarily 
unavailable, or stop working. Servers containing copies of the Governing Contracts can 
become unresponsive, be slow in accessing the relevant files, or have connection issues.  Thus, 
in many contexts, Facebook users may not be able to actually read the Governing Contracts 
when they provide their consent. Finally, Facebook users may not always read lengthy, 
complex and legalistic privacy notices.167 In such cases, to what extent is such consent valid?  
These questions are even more relevant in the context of the upcoming General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), which will drastically reform European data protection and 
privacy laws.168 The GDPR has enhanced provisions on consent. For example, under the 
GDPR, websites like Facebook will be precluded from obtaining consent for data processing 
by tying the user’s acceptance to its terms of use with the acceptance of data processing which 
is not required for the user to use the website169. Here, important questions are raised about 
how companies can obtain valid consent in the data driven economy and the appropriateness 
of relying on consent as the condition for legitimate processing. 
Having analyzed the power effects generated by the materially heterogeneous 
associations that construct valid consent, next, I examine three power effects generated by other 
aspects of Facebook advertisements, namely, mass “dataveillance”, commodifying Facebook 
users, and enacting particular marketplaces.  
 
IX. SEPARATING THE CONNECTED AND CONNECTING THE SEPARATE: 
COMMODIFYING FACEBOOK USERS AS CONSUMERS 
 
Mass “dataveillance” refers to the systematic monitoring of the actions of large groups of 
Facebook users to sort them according to specific criteria, such as demographic, location, 
interests and marital status. 170 So how do Facebook advertisements generate effects of mass 
“dataveillance”? 
Raw Facebook user data, for example, London location, has little commercial value 
to advertisers. However, when raw Facebook data connects to other legal, social, and 
technological actants then these connections can turn potentially mundane information into 
valuable marketing information, such as 20 year old woman living in London who likes 
musicals. The diverse actants which are involved in this process include some algorithms 
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represented in text files that are installed on the Facebook user’s device, 171 other algorithms 
embodied in webpages that permit a website to read or place a cookie,172 protocols through 
which computers communicate with one another, main frame computers or mobile devices 
with their extant networks of copper cables, computational methods including statistical 
analysis, and Facebook users’ valid consent to targeted advertisements. Here, mass 
“dataveillance” is not the outcome of the all-powerful “code” exercising control over other 
actants. Rather mass “dataveillance” is an effect generated through the local, context-specific, 
and often fragile relations between these various legal, social, and technological actants. In 
other words, mass “dataveillance” depends on multiple actions and relations which have to be 
in held in place before any surveillance per se can take place locally. When such connections 
are maintained, then large datasets of information emanating from various sources (for 
example, “likes” and the weekly supermarket shopping) are “acted upon” by these manifold 
actants to gather detailed information about Facebook users’ consumption habits and detect or 
predict how such users are likely to behave in the marketplace.173  
So how much of the Facebook user is visible from these operations? My data analysis 
shows that mass “dataveillance” can often be partial and detailed as specific information, such 
as demographic and geo-location data, are extracted from various “capillaries” of the network 
and inscribed in durable and mobile media, such as graphs and tables, to enable such 
information to be carried from various network points.174 “Mass dataveillance” can also very 
fragile as the scope of the generated vision can change over time as new actants join or old 
actants leave the associative chain. For example, Facebook’s partnership with Datalogix means 
that a richer Facebook user profile can be created by associating native Facebook data with the 
anonymized data collected by Datalogix when Facebook users use their loyalty cards in offline 
transactions.175 Thus, a more comprehensive vision of the Facebook user as consumer is 
generated by mashing up two different data sources. However, such visions can often also be 
hampered as new actants, such as Facebook users opting out of data sharing schemes,176 join 
the associative chain.   
Through this mass “dataveillance”, Facebook advertisements constitute Facebook 
users as consumers of particular products. For example, identifying and associating some 
Facebook users as groups of individuals with particular purchasing habits clusters these users 
into consumer categories including specific lifestyle choices or spending habits. From this 
viewpoint, mass “dataveillance” is productive as it generates categories and sub-categories of 
Facebook users with shared characteristics or purchasing habits. Additionally, Facebook 
advertisements can often constitute Facebook users as consumers by displaying advertisements 
which are deemed to be relevant to a particular group of Facebook users. However, mass 
“dataveillance” can also be restrictive as such categorization can at times maintain or produce 
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social inequalities.177 For example, Facebook advertisements which promote high-end products 
only to Facebook users who spend a specific amount of money in a single transaction can 
generate social inequalities. Furthermore, the techniques which constitute the identities of 
Facebook users as consumers can also exclude them from receiving specific advertisements.178 
Thus, particular versions of the marketplace are enacted through the materially heterogeneous 
connections which generate Facebook advertisements. 
Knowledge is key in constructing Facebook users as consumers and rendering them 
“calculable”“179 as their actions can be observed and measured. For example, the connections 
generating “Adverts Performance” facilitate the evaluation and graphical representations of 
Facebook users’ engagement with advertising campaigns. Advertisers can then use such 
information to further refine their audience for a particular advertisement. This knowledge 
about Facebook users as consumers are dynamic because this information can change as 
Facebook users’ behaviors evolve over time or as advertisers refine their targeting options to 
secure a higher level of user engagement. From this viewpoint, marketplaces are dynamic 
“achievements” which are produced in the here and now through circulating webs of 
knowledge, intervention techniques, and interrelations between actants.   
In more traditional forms of advertising, individuals cannot always contribute to how 
their identities as consumers are delineated. However, in Facebook, individuals can often 
actively exercise some control on how their identities are formed by, for example, indicating 
which advertisements they prefer or preventing certain personal data from being used in 
advertisements. Crucially, many Facebook users often play important roles in generating 
multiple information about their identities as consumers by voluntarily sharing data, such as 
their interests and lifestyle choices, with Facebook and relevant third-parties.  
Unlike the Panopticon, where resistance by the inmates seems futile since the 
Panopticon presents this utopian image of totalizing surveillance which leads to the inmates 
disciplining themselves, in Facebook, users often actively resist being profiled or being shown 
specific advertisements by using third-party technologies, such as AdBlock to block Facebook 
advertisements.  Facebook users can often seek advice on external websites, such as YouTube, 
to find out how they can block Facebook advertisements. 180  These resistance practices are 
arguably instances of “ethical practices” through which Facebook users attempt to negotiate 
their relationships with rules on advertising.181 By using technologies, such as AdBlock, 
Facebook users are questioning certain Facebook rules, such as the rules prohibiting the use of 
filtering technologies, and interpret them creatively in ethics of resistance. 182  Additionally, 
Facebook users are also exercising their agency by resisting certain normalizing forces 
including only using Facebook tools, such as Privacy Settings, to manage Facebook 
advertisements.  
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X. CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, my overarching contention has been that we need to move away from the 
dominant “regulatory” lens to my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens to understand more 
comprehensively the complex and dynamism of online environments when a legal right is at 
risk as well as the multiple power effects generated such cases. This overall assertion is linked 
to a call for locality and heterogeneity when studying online environments. Attending to the 
relevant local and varied material associations draw our attention to the ephemeral and the 
fugitive, and to power effects which can always be otherwise.  
Whilst, pursuing this central argument, I have also argued three additional points. 
Firstly, I have argued that diverse heterogeneous legal, social and technological human and 
non-humans actors are connected with one another in the context of data protection and 
Facebook advertisements. In particular, I have highlighted the dynamism and complexity of 
the regulatory space in Facebook in the context of data protection and advertisements. I have 
also emphasized that the protection and/or violation of a personal data rights is an effect 
generated from specific socio-technical-legal assemblages rather than the outcome of a single 
actant (such as “code” in Lessig’s parlance). Secondly, I have argued multiple and complex 
power effects are generated in Facebook in the context of advertisements and data protection. 
Regulatory effects (e.g. protecting personal data rights) can often be one of the power effects. 
However, other power effects, such as “mass dataveillance” can also be generated from these 
materially heterogeneous connections. Thirdly, through my analysis of valid consent as a 
relational achievement, I have argued that the process through which valid consent is obtained 
in Facebook can often be “routinized”. This suggests that we need to rethink how valid consent 
is SNS, such as Facebook, and explore alternatives to consent in cases when it is not practical 
or possible to gain consent.  
Generally, this article has explored future lines of research in cyberspace regulation. 
In what ways do the relevant material heterogeneous configurations - and their power effects - 
differ from one online platform to another when legal rights are at stake? What are the 
implications of such distinctions or similarities for cyberspace regulation? There are more 
possibilities than can be sketched here and these questions need to be explored further in the 
future. As a concluding thought, it is important to note that we should be wary of 
generalizations when we reflect conceptually on how cyberspace can or should be regulated. It 
is crucial for cyberspace regulation debates to take into account the locality, diversity, and 
fluidity of online environments. We cannot regulate unless we know the particulars of the space 
in question. Thus, abstractions about cyberspace regulation have to deal with the paradox of 
generalizations and particulars in such a way that general principles can be derived although 
their applications are context-dependent.  
